Major powers deliberated on September 19 2008, in Washington over a fourth sound of UN sanctions against Iran to curb its nuclear program, but ended with no firm commitments amid Chinese and Russian opposition to more punitive measures.
Robert Wood, State Department spokesman, told the press that the meeting of senior officials from the permanent five members of the UN Security Council and Germany concluded without agreement on either the timing or content of a new UN resolution on Iran. He was quoted by Reuters (September 19, 2008) to say that the six major powers“remain committed to explore possible further measures on the second tracks,” referring to sanctions under consideration by the six. Wood added that they again urged Iran to accept an offer of trade and other incentives presented in June by an European Union representative in exchange for giving up uranium enrichment. Iran has thus for rejected the offer and stated it will not give up sensitive nuclear work.
On several occasions, Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadi Nejad has brushed aside the threats of more sanctions on his country. He told a news conference in Teheran on September 18 that “whatever they do, Iran will continue its activities. Sanctions are not important, the era of such threats has ended.” Nejad made clear Iran had no plans to suspend uranium enrichment, which can have both civilian and military purposes.
UN’s international Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)stated in a report on September 15 2008 that due to Iranian authorities’ stonewalling and obstruction, its investigation into whether Iran had covertly researched ways to make an atom bomb had come to a standstill. Commenting on the report, Stephen Hadley, President George W. Bush’s National Security Adviser, said it was “not reassuring” that Iran was not cooperating with the IAEA, adding that such a move only increased suspicions in the international community about Iran’s nuclear program. On the other hand, however, Nejad told Iran’s state Pres TV that the IAEA report had confirmed the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program and that Teheran had cooperated with the UN agency with “full transparency”(Reuters, September 18, 2008). He also said the IAEA had no mandate to consider Western intelligence, which claims that Iran had linked projects to process uranium, test high explosives and modify a missile cone in a way suitable for a nuclear warhand.
Iran has withstood three rounds of limited UN sanctions imposed so far. It can count on China, a longstanding and staunch alley of Iran, and Russia, now at odds with the West over George, to delay, obstruct, and water down any harsher measures sought by the EU and the US. If the past experience can serve as a guide, the fourth round of UN sanctions against Iran would be an ordeal, taking month and month of negotiations and haggling, going through comma by comma, and the end result might be another toothless resolution.
China has been on the record opposing UN sanctions against its friends, such as Iran, North Korea or Sudan, over the years. Chinese President Hu Jintao urged world powers on September 6, 2008 to show flexibility to resolve a prolonged stand off over Teherad’s nuclear program, when he met president Ahmadi Nejad after the Iranian president arrived in Beijing for a one day visit to attend the opening ceremony of the Beijing Paralympics. Hu said China respected Iran’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and called for further diplomacy. “At present, the Iran nuclear issue is faced with a rare opportunity for the resumption of talks, and we hope all parties concerned could seize the opportunity and show flexibility to push for a peaceful settlement of the issues,” Xinhua news agency (September 6, 2008) quoted Hu as saying. “China, as always, will be committed to pushing for the settlement of the issue through peaceful negotiations, and will continue to play a constructive role to this end,” Hu added.
According to Xinhua, the Iranian leader told Hu that he hoped a solution acceptable to all parties could be found, “and that the Iran side is willing to keep exchanges and consultations with the Chinese side.”
Some Western observers regard China, a long time ally of Iran and a major buyer of Iranian oil and gas, as key to breaking the diplomatic impasse. In reality, however, Beijing has its own agenda toward Iran and the Middle East, hence it has been reluctant to consider steps and make moves that might hurt its critical strategic ties with Iran and endanger its crucial energy and economic interests.
China’s Strategic Objectives
Since the Shah’s ouster in the late 1970’s Beijing has viewed Iran’s Islamic Republic a potential political ally and sought to cultivate and forge a strategic partnership with Teheran. In addition to being a major source of energy, Iran is an important regional power, capable of playing a leading role in the diplomatic balance in the Gulf region and Middle East, hence a highly valuable anti-Western partner for China. Both China and Iran share the belief that “my enemy’s enemy is my friend,” and they have cooperated to challenge and counter balance US domination and hegemonism.
One instrument that China has utilized to almost perfection is transfer of arms and weapon technology, which greatly adds to China’s ability to win friends and enhance influence quickly, and earn billions of dollars each year. In some cases, Beijing has adopted an “arms for oil” formula, providing weapons in exchange for oil from Iran and Sudan. China’s extensive arms sales to Iran since the 1980s have bolstered Iranian military and weapon production capabilities considerably, with long term and far reaching consequence on the balance of power in the Middle East. Iran arms and sponsors terrorist groups in Iran and other Gulf states and a well-knows patron of the Hizballah guerrillas in Lebanon (sometime in cooperation with Syria), hence a major threat to both the Arab states and Israel, as well as the U.S.
Iran’s acquisition of advanced conventional weapons from China has also posed immense threat to American ships and 15,000 U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf. In the fall of 1987, Iran fired Chinese-made cruise missiles, the “Silkworms”, at two US oil tankers in the Gulf. In the 1980s, Poly Group, a Chinese arms company controlled by the PLA, exported more than $1 billion worth of Silkworms to Iran(Newsweek, July 4, 1988). The Silkworm has been succeeded by the Chinese Eagle strike missile in the 1990s, a much more sophisticated and dangerous weapon modeled on the French Exocet. The new cruise missile has two versions, a solid-fuel, rocket-powered model (designated C-801 by NATO) and a longer range turbojet-powered model(C-802). In 1996, Iran obtained from China Hou dong fast patrol boats which were equipped with C-802. In the late 1990s, two of Iranian Houdong missile patrol boats carried out simulated high-speed attack against the US aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk and the cruiser Cowpens. Such kind of Iranian provocation occurred again in recent months.
Iran has repeatedly vowed a crushing response to any attacks and it has flexed military muscles in recent months by holding war games and showing off an array of weaponry and missiles. During war games in July 2008, aides to the supreme leader Ayatollak Alikhamenei warned that Iran would target US boats and US ships in the Gulf as well as Israel if it was attacked(Khaleej Times, September 1, 2008).
Indeed, there are acute worries in the Gulf region and elsewhere that Iran could cause a global economic catastrophe if it carried out its repeated threat to close the Strait of Hormuz. A horse shoe-shape of water that stretches between Iran and the northern tip of Oman, the Strait of Hormuz is the only way in end out of the Gulf. According to The Gulf, a Bahrain business weekly, on a typical day, around 50 tankers carrying between 14 million and 17 million barrels of oil and oil products pass through the 180 km-long strait, roughly 40 percent of the world’s internationally traded supplies (Gulf Daily News, August 24, 2008).
Iran has large number of Chinese made C-801 and C-802 anti-ship missiles deployed in coastal batteries along the eastern shore of the waterway, aboard and on islands in the Strait. These are expected to play a key role in any effort to block, or control, the waterway. The shipping lanes are known to be narrow, ideal to use anti ship missiles, as naval or civilian vessels have little room for evasive action. Over the past year, coalition naval forces in the Gulf and the Arabian sea have conducted a series of exercise aimed at countering possible Iranian attempts to close Hormuz. These include attacks by large swarms of small, high-speed armed craft or maritime suicide attacks.
Iran claimed that it had amassed a fleet of 1,000 low-tech speedboats to counter the Fifth Fleet’s armada of 30-40 high-tech warships. Broadsides of cruise missiles would be more dangerous. Iran has 3 frigates and 20 fast attack craft including Chinese-supplied Houdong boats, capable of mounting such attacks.
In the summer months of 2008, Iran also test-fired its Shahab-3 missile which it says put Israel within range (Khaleej Times, September 1, 2008). Such an intermediate-range ballistic missile and much longer range versions, the Shahab 4 and 5, which could reach the US, are under development with China’s assistance. On February 4, 2009, New York Times reported that Iran had successfully launched its first so–called domestically produced satellite—an indication that Iran had made considerable progress in its ballistic missile system.
It should be emphasized that the Sino-Iranian cooperation on arms deals is not confined to conventional weapons, it also includes “NBC”-- nuclear weapons technology, biological weapons and chemical weapons. Whereas Beijing has vehemently denied its sales of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technology to the rogue states, international intelligent agencies have collected enough information that identifies China as the world’s “leading proliferator”. For diplomatic and other important reasons, the US and Eu rarely blow whistle on China’s illicit arms sales to the rogue states and its outrageous violation of international anti-proliferation goals.
There are exceptions, however. On June 25, 2008 the top Asian official at the Pentagon told the US House of Representatives Armed Service Committee that Chinese firms have repeatedly violated UN sanctions which ban the sales of weapons, military equipment and nuclear technology to Iran, and “China’s willingness to cooperate on these is uneven” (AFP, Washington June 27,2008), James Shinn, US Assistant Secretary of Defense for –Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, said he was particularly concerned over China’s sales of weapons to Iran, accusing Teheran of supporting militant groups in Iraq, Lebanon and Afghanistan. “ that target and kill American and our allies.”
From time to time, the U.S. have sanctioned Chinese companies for selling Iran weapons, weapons-related products and other duel-use commodities that can have military use, and Beijing has condemned those US moves.
Sino-Iranian Energy and Economic Ties
In response to US pressure, some European companies have cut their trade with Iran or withdrawn investment. Royal Dutch Shell and Repsol of Spain withdrew last year. In early July 2008, French oil giant Total announced that it would pull out of a planned investment in a huge gas project in Iran’s South Pars gas field. As Western companies move out, Chinese firms step in to fill the void and take the business. On July 28, 2008, Iran’s Pars Oil and Gas company and China National offshore Oil Corp. announced an agreement to exploit North Pas gas field, and plan to start to sell the gas from the North Pass gas field in international markets soon.
China is Iran s’ top oil market. Iran is China’s third-largest supplier, behind only Angola and Saudi Arabia, exporting about 300,000 barrels of oil to China. Moreover, China’s oil giant Sinopec Group is going to buy 250 million tons of natural gas in 30 years from Iran, and will help Iran develop its huge Yadavaran oilfield in exchange for Iran’s commitment of exporting 150,000 barrels of oil per day to China for 25 years at market price.
In addition to energy field, China is also involved extensively in many areas of Iran’s economic development. More than 100 Chinese state companies are working in Iran to help build infrastructure projects-- highways, ports, shipyards, airports, dams, steel complex and many other projects. When Teheran’s subway was completed in February 2000, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan was present for the opening ribbon-cutting ceremony. Likewise President Jiang Zemin made a state visit to Teheran in April 2002 to cement ties with Iran.
A casual visitor to Teheran is impressed by the supply of Chinese products in the supermarkets and department stores. Two-way trade between the two nations has reached 11 billion dollars in 2008, surpassing 9.5 billion in 2007. China is already Iran’s second largest trading partner, behind only the UAE. It goes without saying that Beijing outright violates UN sanctions on Iran.
China, Iran, and Russia have overlapping interests on many issues. They are partners to the Asian Energy Security Grid, an alterative to US-led Western control of the world’s energy resources. Iran has also joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization(SCO) as an observer.
Iran’s president Ahmadi Nejad was present when the SCO convened annual a summit meetings in 2007 and 2008. The organization is largely a Chinese tool to counter US presence in Central Asia and promote Beijing’s interests.
Is China a U.S. friend of foe? President George Bush once considered China a strategic rival, but he gradually changed his view, as the U.S. sought China’s cooperation on the war against terror after 2001, and pursued a mercantilistic policy toward China. Before Bush completed his tenure in the White House, China was treated more like an important partner on many issues, while China’s possible threat to American interests and US-China differences were minimized or overlooked.
How will the U.S-China relations evolve under the Obama administration? Secretary of state Hillary Clinton asserted in an article published in Foreign Affairs in 2007 that US-China relations would be the most important bilateral relationship in the globe in this century and lauded China’s role on the break through in North Korea’s nuclear weapon at the six-nation talks.
Granted that she was only a U.S. Senator then, and not well informed on US-China relations, nor on the six-party talk on North Korea, yet those remarks seem to betray her naivete and wishful thinking. Whereas Beijing voted for UN sanctions on Iran’s suspicious nuclear program, China outright violated these sanctions by providing Iran with various economic and military assistance, including weapons, NBC and missile technologies.
President Obama’s Foreign policy calls for nonproliferation of nuclear arms and assistance to the development of democracy in the world, among others. Both Iran and Syria are China’s important allies, will China ever work with the U.S to stop two Middle Eastern states from developing their nuclear arms?
Although Beijing and Washington are not at present involved in an open confrontation in the Middle East, the potentials for Sino-US conflict over Iran’s nuclear weapons, proliferation and China’s growing strategic influence in the Middle East should not be overlooked.Nor should the US ignore the fact that China has its own agenda toward the Middle East—an agenda which forges close relations with Iran and Syria, and challenges US policy and interests in the region.
